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Case No. 8251
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MAXINE D. LINDSAY,
Appellant,
vs.
ECCLES HOTEL COMPANY, a corporation, doing business under the trade name
and style of Hotel Ben Lomond,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 22, 1948, Appellant was a patron in the
Coffee Shop of the Respondent Hotel Company (Appellant's Deposition 3, 4; Deposition of Lillian McGahy 4).
The floor of the shop was of tile construction, which was
slippery when wet <Tr. 12, 17, 18). The weather was dry
outside (Dep. Lillian McGahy 6) and the floor was dry
when Appellant came in and was seated (Dep. Lillian
McGahy 5, 10).
The table at which Appellant and her companion
were seated was near the rear or east end of the Coffee
Shop on the south side, near the door to the kitchen
(Appellant's Dep. 4, 5, 6; Dep. Lillian McGahy 4 and Affidavit attached) and near the station where waitresses
filled glasses and pitchers with water and ice (Affidavit
attached to Dep. of Lillian -McGahy).
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A long counter was at the front of the Shop <Appellant's Dep. 5) on the south side, and waitresses attending patrons at the counter and at other tables walked up
and down the aisle past Appellant's table (Appellant's
Dep. I3) with servings of food and water <Appellant's
Dep. I3, I4).
Between the time Appellant was seated and the time
she left her table water had been spilled on the floor <Dep.
Lillian McGahy 4, 5, 9) about a foot from the chair on
which she had been seated <Dep. Lillian McGahy 6). It
was the dinner hour, the waitresses were rushed, and the
Hostess Lillian McGahy was helping the waitresses <Dep.
Lillian McGahy 8, I 0, II>.
On leaving her table, after finishing her refreshment,
she started to walk toward the cashier to pay her check
<Appellant's Dep. IO). As she did so, she slipped on some
water on the floor <Dep. Lillian McGahy 4, 5, IO) of the
aisle (Appellant's Dep. 10), between two rows of tables
<Appellant's Dep. 10) somewhat north and west of where
she had- been sitting (Appellant's Dep. 10), her white
shoe (Appellant's Dep~ 3, 4) making a white mark (Appellant's Dep. 10; Dep. Lillian McGahy 4, 9) about six
inches long (Appellant's Dep. 11; Dep. Lillian McGahy
10), and where her heel had been in and had slipped
through the water <Dep. Lillian McGahy 4, 9) and sustained the injuries complained of.
Appellant's amended complaint alleged negligence
on the part of the Respondent: ( 1) In placing water or
other slippery substance on the floor, or in causing the
same to be on the floor, and in allowing or permitting it
to remain thereon in such condition as to cause it to be
dangerous to persons walking over and upon it <Para2
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graph 4 (a), Tr. 002); (2) In failing to give plaintiff and
other persons any signal or warning of the slippery or
dangerous condition of the floor at the time <Paragraph
4 (b), Tr. 002); (3) In failing, after Respondent knew or
should have known of the dangerous condition of the
floor when wet, to remove the water or other substance
therefrom or to take such other necessary action to remove
or obivate the dangerous condition of the floor when \vet,
by covering the floor with rubber mats or by the use of
other means (See Amendment to Amended Complaint,
Tr. 008).
Respondent in its answer denied liability generally
and specifically, and alleged that if there were any water
or substance spilled on the floor it had no knowledge of
such fact prior to the time Appellant claimed to have
slipped thereon, and alleged contributory negligence (Tr.
003).
After a number of stipulated continuances the case
was set for trial on April 14, 1954, and counsel for both
parties were informed by the Court that no further continuances would be granted under any circumstances and
that the case would be tried or dismissed on that date. The
case was tried before the jury and submitted.
Appellant was unable to attend the trial because of
her physical condition and her deposition was ordered
published and admitted in evidence <Tr. 004). The deposition of one witness, Lillian McGahy, a resident of the
State of California, was also published and admitted in
evidence after portions of it had been ordered corrected
or deleted ( Tr. 009) . The following portions of her deposition were ruled inadmissable or changed by the trial
3
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court; and counsel for Appellant and Respondent have
stipulated that these are the portions so ruled upon:
Page 4, line 24, changed from "her" to "a".
Page 5, lines 11 and 12 deleted.
Page 6, lines 24 to 32, inclusive, deleted.
Page 7, lines 1 to 6, inclusive, deleted.
Affidavit attached to the Deposition (referred to
as plaintiff's Exhibit One) deleted.
The jury was unable to reach a decision and was
discharged <Tr. 007). At the conclusion of Appellant's
case Respondent made a motion for a directed verdict
which was overruled. At the conclusion of Respondent's
case the Respondent's motion was renewed and ruling
reserved by the Court <Tr. 006). On or about the 22nd
day of April, 1954, Respondent served a "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Discharge of the Jury" upon
Appellant which motion was thereafter argued and submitted. On May 7, 1954, the Respondent's Motion was
granted by the Court <Tr. 010).
Subsequent to the accident Appellant's mind became
affected somewhat and in her deposition (Tr. 004) she
testified that the name of her companion on the date of
the accident was a Mrs. Davidson (Appellant's Dep. 3, 9,
15, 16) whom her attorneys could not find. At the time
of the trial, Appellant's health was such that her doctor
would not permit her to testify, so that the case was tried
as to her testimony on her deposition. Two days before
the trial her attorneys discovered that the companion she
had called "Mrs. Davidson" in her deposition was in fact
a Mrs. Everetsen who, as it turned out, was at that time
residing in Salt Lake City but was too ill to attend Court
and testify.
4
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Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside
Respondent's "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Discharge of the Jury"; and to Impanel a New Jury and
Set Case for Trial; or, in the alternative, Motion for New
Trial (Tr. 011). In support of her motion, Appellant obtained and filed with the trial Court an Affidavit from the
person identified as "Mrs. Everetsen" <Eleanor McFarlane Everetsen) previously called "Mrs. Davidson" by the
Appellant. The Affidavit is dated May 14, 1954, shortly
after the trial of the case, and was attached to and made
a part of Appellant's Motion to Reconsider, and Appellant's alternative Motion for a New Trial. In that Affidavit, offered to the trial court as newly discovered evidence, the proposed witness said under oath:

"* * * that she is acquainted with Maxine D.
Lindsay, plaintiff above-named; that she was with
the said Maxine D. Lindsay on the 22nd day of
June, 1948, in the Hotel Ben Lomond Coffee Shop
when the said Maxine D. Lindsay slipped and fell
to the floor; that she, affiant, saw a waitress spill
water on the floor in the aisle near the table at
which they sat; that neither said waitress nor anyone else wiped it up; that it did not occur to her
at the time to invite the attention of the said
Maxine D. Lindsay to the spilled water; that later
when she and the said Maxine D. Lindsay started
to leave said Coffee Shop she, affiant, saw the said
Maxine D. Lindsay slip on the wet floor and fall
to the floor; that she saw water still remaining on
the floor after she helped the said Maxine D. Lindsay up from the floor;
"That when the said Maxine D. Lindsay fell to
the floor she fell very heavily; that her feet seemed
to fly out from under her; and that she fell instantly and abruptly to the floor.
5
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"That affiant was ill and unable to attend court
at the time of the trial of said cause, although requested so to do by one of plaintiff's attorneys on
each of the two days immediately prior to the trial
of said cause on April 14th, 1954."
Notwithstanding that Affidavit and the basic facts therein
set forth, pertinent to the real issue of the case, the trial
court on July 20, 1954 (Tr. 012) denied Appellant's motion to reconsider and denied Appellant's alternative motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISCHARGE
OF THE JURY.
2. THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.
3. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ADMIT IN
EVIDENCE THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF
LILLIAN McGAHY, "EXHIBIT ONE" OF
THE DEPOSITION OF LILLIAN McGAHY,
AND IN STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEPOSITION FROM THE EVIDENCE .
. 4. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S "MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
DISCHARGE OF THE JURY"; AND TO IM. PANEL A NEW JURY AND SET CASE FOR
TRIAL; OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
I.

5.

ERRORS IN LAW.
6
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ARGUMENT
So that the Court will be able to grasp readily the
issues on this appeal, Appellant states the theory of her
case, before discussing the several points which support
that theory.
It is Appellant's theory of the case, divided into two
parts:
A. That it was negligence for Respondent to fail to
place rubber or other mats -on its floor to protect patrons
from falling, when it knew or should have known its floor
was slippery when wet and knew or should have known
that water or other substances were frequently or occasionally spilled thereon.
B. That the Respondent was negligent in spilling
water on the floor and not wiping it up, when Respondent
knew or should have known that its floor was slippery
when wet.
Appellant will address the same argument generally
to
Point 1. ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANTING

Point 2.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISCHARGE OF THE JURY.
THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION WAS CONTRARY TO
LAW.
and

Point 5. ERRORS IN LAW.
We think this case comes squarely within the decision of this Court in:
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., et al,
- - - U.
, 232 P. (2) 210.
7
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See also W. T. Grant Co. vs. Karren,
190 F. (2) 710.
In applying the law of the Walgreen case, consider
the facts in this one: The floor was of ceramic tile
which was slippery when wet. Appellant was a patron seated at a table at the rear of the Coffee Shop
near the kitchen door where waitresses filled glasses
and pitchers of water. When she was seated there
was no water on the floor. Between that time and
the time she rose to leave water had been spilled
on the floor about a foot from the chair on which she had
been seated. On leaving her place at the table Appellant
slipped and fell to the floor. There was a visible mark
on the floor where a heel had been in, slipped through
the water. It was not raining outside and had not been
raining that day. In her deposition the Hostess Lillian
McGahy was asked how long the water had been on the
floor. She answered: "Evidently just at that time a girl
passed through perhaps had spilled some. I can't remember." <Dep. Lillian McGahy 5). The answer was stricken
by the trial court; erroneously, we contend. There was no
other source for the water. It was the dinner hour, the
waitresses were rushed, and the Hostess Lillian McGahy
was helping the waitresses. No one saw the quantity of
water before the fall, but the testimony of the Hostess
Lillian McGahy was that she saw water on the floor when
she came back from the kitchen as she was coming
through the kitchen door at the same time she saw Appellant sitting on the floor (Dep. Lillian McGahy 9). She
did not remember observing whether or not Appellant's
dress was wet (Dep. Lillian McGahy 9) so that the quantity of water then observed was what was left after Appellant's heel had passed through it and after she had fallen
8
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to the floor on or near the water, and after an undefined
portion of it had evidently been displaced or absorbed by
Appellant's clothing in the fall. There· still remained
visible "about three tablespoonfuls" of water (Dep. Lillian
McGahy 10). That amount of water on a hard-surfaced
floor is a considerable quantity.
In addition, we can now prove positively, by the
proposed witness Mrs. Everetsen, that a waitress did spill
the water, and thereby remove the last vestige of doubt,
if any there ever were, as to the source of the water and
the responsibility of the Respondent for its being there
and for its remaining there. In view of this additional
evidence, if not before, Appellant should have her day in
court and have a jury pass upon her cause.
Certainly, under this state of facts the question was
one for the jury, as held in the Walgreen Drug Co. case,
supra, and should have been re-submitted by the trial
court after the first jury disagreed.

Point 3.

REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ADMIT IN
EVIDENCE THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF
LILLIAN McGAHY, "EXHIBIT ONE" OF
THE DEPOSITION OF LILLIAN McGAHY,
AND IN STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEPOSITION FROM THE EVIDENCE.

The affidavit of Lillian McGahy relating to the accident was obtained on or about the 18th day of February,
1949. Thereafter she disappeared from the scene and was
ultimately located in California. She had become a hostile
witness. She not only refused to return to Utah to testify
but refused to appear for the purposes of taking her deposition until compelled to do so.
9
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A comparison of the affidavit and the deposition
shows many variances as to facts. It is our contention that
the jury should have had both of them in their deliberations. The affidavit, it will be observed, clearly shows the
practice of the waitresses, and the source of the water.
That affidavit was made when the facts were fresh in the
memory of the affiant. It is true that Appellant's associate counsel in California did not pursue this comparison
for impeachment purposes as far as he should have but
we submit that he made the affidavit a part of the deposition for that purpose. Respondent's attorney in California
could have availed himself of unlimited examination on
both the affidavit and the deposition.
We have made an extensive search in an attempt to
find cases on a similar situation, but have been unable
to find any. We are compelled to submit this point based
upon this brief statement.
Point 4.

REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S "MOTION FOR JU D G M EN T NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISCHARGE OF THE
JURY"; AND TO IMPANEL A NEW JURY
AND SET CASE FOR TRIAL; OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial was based primarily upon the supporting Affidavit of one Eleanor McFarlane Everetsen and should have been granted. It is
admitted that it is discretionary with the trial court as to
whether a new trial shall be granted and that his ruling
will be upset only for an abuse of discretion. The requirement of the statute is as follows: <Rule 59 (4) )
JO
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"Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced
at the trial."
A reading of the affidavit will show that the evidence
therein contained was not cumulative nor of the same
general nature as the evidence adduced at the trial. The
evidence as to ho'v the water got on the floor is material,
primary and direct, particularly in view of the Court's
subsequent granting of Respondent's motion after having
allowed the case to go to the jury.
The only question on this point is whether Appellant
used reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and
producing it at the trial.
Again, we call attention to the fact that the identity
of the witness was not known to Appellant's attorneys until two days before the trial. It must be borne in mind
that Appellant's mind had become affected as a result of
the accident and she could not be held to a strict accountability for her conduct or memory. Counsel spent time
and effort in trying to locate a "Mrs. Davidson'' but
naturally were unsuccessful. When the true name of the
witness was made known to Appellant's attorneys they
undertook to find her and finally located her in Salt Lake
City. By that time the jury had been called, the trial date
definitely fixed, and the trial about to begin. Counsel
talked to her husband by telephone during each of two
days immediately preceding the trial and were informed
by her husband that she was ill in bed and could not possibly appear.
The Court had previously emphatically stated that
there would be no more continuances of the case and that
11
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it would either be tried or dismissed on that date so that
counsel did not feel justified in requesting another continuance and thereby incurring the ill will of the Court,
particularly when counsel did not know whether the testimony of Mrs. Everetsen would be material or merely
cumulative. Moreover, to have made a motion for a further continuance would have been a.:futile thing, and such
a motion would have been denied by the trial court. He
had expressed definite impatience in stating that no more
continuances would be granted; and would not have called
off the jury at that late date. Of this, counsel for Appellant was then, and are now convinced.
It is difficult for Appellant to ascertain what more
could have been done to satisfy the requirement of due
diligence than was done under ·the particular facts and
circumstances of this case. ·Hindsight might now suggest
a different course of action; but under stress of trial, Appellant's counsel used their best judgment. That judgment might have been erroneous, but certainly there was
no lack of due diligence.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Appellant submits that the trial court
erred in not· submitting this cause again to a jury; and
submit that Appellant's motion for new trial should have
been granted.
Respectfully submitted,
LE-WIS J. WALLACE
M.· BLAINE PETERSON
of
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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